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Cross-shareholding and the Long-run Performance 
of Stock Returns in the Japanese Keiretsu : An 
Empirical Analysis using panel data 
Jurgen Schraepen 
Abstract 
Using a sample of Japanese keiretsu firms, this paper examines the 
relation between the cross-holding of equity and the long-run perfor-
mance of stock returns. We set the hypothesis that under the paradigm 
and neoclassical theory of profit maximization, the objective of cross-
shareholding must be to maximize the stock-returns of the firm, so that 
there should exist an abnormal return premium for investing in a 
portfolio of firms with a high percentage of cross-shareholding. Making 
portfolio's conditional on the percentage of cross-shareholding and 
calculating their cumulative market-adjusted returns, we find that 
comparing with the market return, the high cross-shareholding portfolio 
did not significantly outperform or underperform the market return in 
the 15 year period of our sample. Comparing the returns of the high 
and low cross-shareholding portfolio's, we find that the high cross-
shareholding Portfolio only ouゆerformedthe low cross-shareholding 
portfolio in the 1990-'97 period. For the 1983-'89 period we find a 
relative strong underperformance. From the evidence of the pooled and 
fixed efect panel data regressions, we find evidence that a higher level 
of cross-shareholding is related to lower stock returns in the 1983-'89 
Period. For the 1990-'97 period, there is evidence of a Positive impact 
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but these results are not robust. Taking al the evidence together, we can 
conclude that a higher level of cross-shareholding does not lead to 
higher stock returns. Firms who hold a high percentage of equity in 
otherガrmsin the keiretsu do this not necessaガlyto maximize their 
market value of equity or stock returns. This conclusion is similar to 
that of Nakatani (1984) who found that the puゅoseof belonging to the 
keiretsu is not to maximize the profits of theガrm.
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I • Introduction 
A remarkable feature of the Japanese capital market is unmistakenly 
the cross-holding of equity ('Kabushiki mochiai'in Japanese) between 
firms. Being something almost only existing in Japan, cross-sharehold-
ing has had great impact on the Japanese corporate structure. Cross-
shareholding as a form of ownership of the firm, together with other 
features of the Japanese financial market, has created the base for 
manager's control of the firm, has made possible the longterm and 
stable relationship between companies and is one of the basic structures 
of what we now know as Japanese management. 
The cross-holding of equity is most prominent in the keiretsu, the six 
major company groups that include some of the biggest companies in 
Japan1>. In a company group an average of up to 20 % of al shares are 
being held inside the same group (see appendix 1), and it is the main 
bank that takes the central position in the shareholding of equity and 
that plays a major role in the financial activities and governing of the 
keiretsu. 
The Japanese keiretsu and its main feature of reciprocal sharehold-
ings among its member firms has been described extensively in the 
literature (Aoki, 1988; Sheard, 1986, 1989, 1994; Lincoln, Gerlach, 
Takahashi, 1992; Flath, 1996; Bergl5f and Perotti, 1994). Aggregated, 
the cross-shareholding of equity, where each company in the keiretsu 
holds, and is being hold a small percentage in the equity of other firms, 
1) There are 6 financial keiretsu, who can be divided in keiretsu that originated 
from the pre-war Zaibatsu (Mitsubishi, Mitsui and Sumitomo) and the keiretsu 
that developed around banks (Sanwa, Dai-ichi Kangyo(DKB) and Fuji). 
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can assure mutual control between the firms. It is often said the 
keiretsu and its reciprocal shareholdings are merely something sym-
bolic, but in the literature they are seen as a part of the governance 
mechanism. The functions of cross-shareholding are said to be facilitat-
ing trade between their member firms (Caves and Uekusa, 1976); to 
exchange information (Goto, 1982); enforcing reorganizations of firms 
in financial distress (Sheard, 1986); to defend oneself against takeovers 
(Aoki, 1987; Ramseyer, 1987; Sheard, 1991); or to enhance risk-sharing 
among member firms (Sheard, 1989,1994; Nakatani, 1984). 
Many empirical studies have also looked into the ownership concen-
tration in the keiretsu and firm performance in Japan. One study is that 
of Caves and Uekusa (1976). They tested the hypothesis of joint-profit 
maximization of the keiretsu, and examined whether the group-affiliat-
ed firms earned higher profits than other, independent companies. They 
found that profits on total assets for the 1961-70 period are negatively 
related to group affiliation. 
Another more influential empirical study on the equity ownership 
structure in the keiretsu and firm performance is that of N akatani 
(1984). Under the paradigm of neoclassical theory where the firm 
maximizes its profits or market value, N akatani, just like Caves and 
Uekusa, tests the hypothesis whether the keiretsu or corporate group-
ings enhance profitability. His empirical analysis shows that the aver-
age profitability and the growth rate of profits is significantly lower in 
keiretsu or group affiliated firms than in independent firms. N akatani' 
s empirical findings for his sample period of 1971-82 hereby confirm the 
results of the Caves and Uekusa study that firms affiliated with groups 
or keiretsu are not profit maximizers. However, Nakatani finds clear 
evidence that the variability of performance of the group-affiliated 
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firms is smaller than that of the independent firms. He concludes that 
the motivation for the formation of financial corporate groupings must 
therefore not be found in profit maximizing but in the risk sharing• 
among the group. He states that the formation of groups serves the 
purpose of stabilizing corporate performance over time at the cost of 
sacrificing the level of corporate performance. 
Prowse (1992), in his research on the ownership concentration and 
profitability in the keiretsu and independent firms, finds that ownership 
concentration in independent Japanese firms is positively related to the 
returns from exerting greater control over management. He finds this 
is not the case in firms that are members of corporate groups (keiretsu). 
Prowse results are consistent with the notion that there exist two 
distinct corporate governance mechanisms in Japan -one among the 
independent firms and one among the keiretsu firms-. 
Gerlach (1992) doesn't find decisive evidence of a difference in corpo-
rate performance between keiretsu and independent companies. He 
reports some contrary findings: keiretsu membership and corporate 
profitability as measured by returns on assets are negatively correlated 
and statistically significant, while on the other hand dominant owner-
ship and main bank share of total loans prove significantly and positive-
ly correlated with company profitability. While group membership 
continues to be associated with somewhat poorer profitability, the 
results of Gerlach suggest also some support for the view that concen-
tration of ownership in Japan is associated with performance improve-
ments. 
In a more recent study, Lichtenberg and Pushner (1994) tackle the 
same hypothesis regarding the relationship between ownership struc-
ture and corporate performance in Japan. One of the conclusions of 
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their empirical study is that high levels of intercorporate shareholding 
insulate firms from the capital market at the expense of firm perfor-
- mance. They observe a large negative impact of corporate ownership 
on corporate profits. 
All the empirical research mentioned above directly or indirectly 
suggests a negative relationship between firm performance and keiret-
su membership. The general conclusion is that the horizontal keiretsu 
generally do not improve corporate performance. 
This paper will focus on the relation between the crossholding of 
equity in the Japanese keiretsu and stock returns as a measure of firm 
performance. Whereas the empirical studies mentioned above pose the 
central question whether belonging to the keiretsu maximizes company 
profits or not, we will look at relationship of cross-shareholding inside 
the horizontal keiretsu and its influence on the market value of equity. 
We will look for evidence on the relation between the percentage of 
cross-shareholding and corporate performance as measured by stock 
returns. We will look for a significantly positive or negative relation 
between the percentage of cross-shareholding and long-run abnormal 
stock returns and we try to find out if the investor holding shares in 
companies that have a large or a small percentage of cross-sharehold-
ing can expect abnormal positive or negative returns. 
Next to the literature on Japanese equity ownership and firm perfor-
mance, our research tries to contribute to the empirical research on the 
determinants of stock returns. By now we know that in explaining the 
return premium, size, the book-to-market ratio, earnings yield, price-
cash-flow ratio and the firm's prior return have explanative power. 
Concerning evidence from the Japanese capital market, Chan, Hamao 
and Lakonishok (1991) found a significant relationship between earn-
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ings yield, size, book-to-market ratio and cash-flow yield and stock-
returns in their sample including al stocks from both sections of the 
Tokyo Stock Exchange. Their evidence showed that of al variables 
used, the book-to-market ratio and cash-flow yield have the most 
significant positive impact on returns. In this article we will try to find 
out how cross-shareholding is related to stock returns and how much 
explanatory power the cross-shareholding variable has in addition to 
the variables above. 
To answer these questions we will investigate the returns of port-
folios made out of high and low cross-shareholding stocks. As is often 
used in the under-and overreaction theory (DeBondt and Thaler, 1985) 
and in event studies2l to evaluate the impact of an event on stock prices 
and stock returns, we will use cumulated abnormal market-adjusted 
returns (CMAR's) to look into this matter. We look at the long-run 
abnormal stock returns of a strategy of investing in firms who's 
percentage of cross-shareholding is high or low. We will look at yearly 
cumulated market adjusted abnormal stock returns of the portfolios 
formed on this high or low shareholding variable, and we will test their 
significancy. We also regress the returns of the individual firms on the 
level of cross-shareholding and a set of control variables as pointed out 
above. 
From the results of our tests, we will try to make implications 
2) Many recent studies in financial economics analyze the long-run behavior of 
stock returns following major corporate events or decisions, such as dividend 
initiation, stock splits, acquisitions, or security offerings. In these studies the 
post-event return performance of sample firms is tracked for a period of time 
following the event. Long horizon tests are important for understanding 
whether unusual performance preceded or caused an event. Test for post-event 
abnormal performance provide also evidence on market efficiency. 
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concerning the relation between stock returns and the level of cross-
shareholding. 
Looking at the empirical evidence, we find that there is contrasting 
evidence. Comparing to the market return, the high cross-shareholding 
portfolio does not show evidence of statistically under-or outperform-
ing the market return, whereas the low cross-shareholding portfolio on 
the other hand shows evidence of statistically outperforming the 
market return in the 1983-89 period and underperforming the market 
return in the 1990-97 period. Next, comparing the returns of the high 
and the low cross-shareholding portfolios, we find that the high cross-
shareholding portfolio, only slightly significant though, underperforms 
the low cross-shareholding portfolio in the 1983-89 period, and outper-
forms it in the 1990-97 period. 
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the hypotheses 
which we will investigate. Section 3 describes the data,・the variables 
and the research methodology. Summary statistics and statistical infer-
ence are reported in Section 4. Section 5 reports the regression results 
and concluding remarks are presented in Section 6. 
I. Hypotheses 
In neoclassical economic theory, under the assumptions of perfect 
capital markets and certainty, the firm tries to maximize its profits or 
its market value. Therefore, the practice of cross-shareholding with 
companies in the keiretsu should be a vehicle for profit-maximization 
of the firm. However, under imperfect capital markets and with infor-
mation asymmetry between managers and shareholders, this theory of 
profit maximization does not necessarily hold (see N akatani 1984). 
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N akatani views the grouping of firms in the keiretsu as a way of 
insulating group firms from the pressure of market competition. 
Therefore, reciprocal shareholdings can also be seen as an effective 
means to create imperfection in the capital market and to weaken the 
influence of general shareholders. The larger the percentage of recipro-
cal cross-shareholding, the larger the managerial discresion of the 
management in these firms. The feature of cross-shareholding can 
thereby be an effective means for insulating the company from the 
threat of competition in the capital market. It can keep management 
protected from outside pressure and therefore does not necessarily 
imply profit maximization of the firm. 
We will set up a hypothesis of stock return-maximization, which is 
a variant of the profit maximization theory. Under the theory of profit 
maximization the practice of cross-shareholding equity should also 
lead to stock-return-maximization of the firm. However, reciprocal 
shareholdings can be seen as an effective means to create imperfection 
in the capital market and therefore, do not necessarily imply maximiz-
ing the stock returns of the firm. 
In the first hypothesis we will take the long-run stock returns of the 
cross-shareholding portfolios and compare them to the market return. 
We will check if they significantly outperform the market return. In 
other words, we will test if there exists a significant positive or 
negative return premium for investing in companies who have a high 
percentage of cross-shareholding. The first hypothesis is, 
HO : Under the paradigm and neoclassical theory of profit maximiza-
tion, the objective of cross-shareholding must be to enhance the 
profitability or the market value of equity (stock-returns) of the 
100 (310) 第 46 巻第 3 号
firm. Therefore, stock-returns of firms with a high percentage of 
cross-shareholding must significantly outperform the market 
return. There should exist an abnormal return premium for invest-
ing in a portfolio of firms with a high percentage of cross-sharehol-
ding. (null hypothesis of return maximization or null hypothesis of 
abnormal returns) 
Hl : Cross-shareholding creates imperfection in the capital market, and 
is a means for management to protect themselves from general 
shareholders. Firms with a high percentage of cross-shareholding 
do not necessarily maximize the profit of the firm as measured by 
stock-returns, and therefore do not outperform the market return. 
There should therefore not necessarily exist an abnormal return 
premium for investing in a portfolio of firms with a high percent-
age of cross-shareholding, (alternative hypothesis of no return 
maximization or alternative hypothesis of no abnormal returns) 
In the next hypothesis we will investigate the same relation between 
cross-shareholding and stock-returns, but instead of comparing to the 
market return, we will now be comparing the stock-returns of the high 
and low cross-shareholding portfolio's. Our hypothesis is as follows. 
HO: Under the paradigm and neoclassical theory of profit maximiza-
tion, the objective of cross-shareholding must be to enhance the 
profitability or the market value of equity (stock-returns) of the 
firm. Therefore, stock-returns of a portfolio of firms with a high 
percentage of cross-shareholding must significantly outperform 
the stock-returns of a portfolio of firms with a low percentage of 
cross-shareholding . Inother words, there should exist a significant 
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difference in returns between the high and the low cross-sharehold・
ing portfolio's. (null hypothesis of return maximization, null 
hypothesis of abnormal return difference) 
H2 : Cross-shareholding creates imperfection in the capital market, and 
is a means for management to protect themselves from general 
shareholders. A portfolio of firms with a high percentage of cross 
-shareholding does not necessarily maximize the profit of the firm 
as measured by stock-returns, and therefore does not outperform 
the returns of a portfolio of firms with a low percentage of cross 
-shareholding. In other words, there should not exist a significant 
difference in returns between the high and the low cross-sharehold-
ing portfolio's. (alternative hypothesis of no return maximization, 
null hypothesis of no abnormal return difference) 
II. Data description and research methodology 
1 . Data 
Data for common stocks listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange, used 
for calculating the yearly stock returns (without dividends), come from 
the Nikkei Shinbun (Japanese version of the Wall-street Journal) and 
the TOYO KEIZAI CD-ROM for stock prices. Yearly returns are 
calculated from 1983 until 1999 for every stock in the sample. The 
return on the Topix (Tokyo Stock Price Index) is used as the market 
index. Using the Topix, which is an index of al the stocks on the Tokyo 
Stock Exchange, would be a better benchmark for the market than the 
Nikkei index, which contains only 225 stocks. Further, yearly returns, 
rather than monthly returns, are used because they reflect better the 
long term properties of the cross-holding of equity. Using longterm 
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yearly returns together with cross-shareholding, which has longterm 
properties, should avoid misspecification bias. 
Other accounting variables like Earnings yield (E/P), Book-to-mar・
ket ratio (B/P), Cash-flow yield (C/P) and Size are calculated using 
data from the NIKKEi NEEDS database, which is an equivalent of the 
US Compustat database. 
The cross-shareholding percentages data come from the KIGYO 
KEIRETSU SORAN, published by TOYO KEIZAI. Every year they 
publish the average percentage of cross-shareholding for the individual 
firms in the big 6 group companies or Keiretsu (Mitsubishi, Mitsui, 
Sumitomo, Sanwa, Fuji, Dai-ichi Kangyo). We take the firms from the 
6 group companies like they appear in the KIGYO KEIRETSU SORAN 
for our sample, and we will use their percentage of shareholding as a 
basis for our sample formation. We can define the percentage of cross 
-shareholding variable as 
Percentage of cross-shareholding= 
Percentage of shares that one firm is holding in other firms of the group 
total number of firms who's shares are being held 
For example, if firm A holds 1.5 % of firm B, 2.5 % of firm C, 3.5 % of 
firm D and 4.5 % of firm E, than the percentage of shareholding for firm 
A that we will use as a variable can be calculated as 1.5 % + 2.5 % + 3.
5 %+4.5 % / 4=3 %. That is, firm A holds on average 3 % of the 
shares of the firms B,C,D and E. Also, if firm B holds 1 % of firm A, 2 
% of firm C, 3 % of firm D and 4 % of firm E, then the shareholding 
variable for firm B will be 1 %+2 %+3 %+4 % / 4=2.5 %. We will 
calculate shareholding percentages like this for every firm in the 
sample. On average, the percentage of shareholding for firms in the 
sample varies from 0.02 % to 5 %. 
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Important is the fact that the shareholding percentages for firms we 
use here reflect only the level of cross-shareholding among the 20 
biggest shareholders in the group. Also important to notice is the fact 
that cross-shareholding of shares of firms outside the six groups are 
not included. Since the percentage of cross-shareholding will reflect 
only the level of shareholding between firms inside the group or 
keiretsu, the variable is not a good representative for the general level 
of shareholding in Japan. We will use this data because no better data 
are available on cross-shareholding. Therefore we will concentrate our 
research only on the cross-shareholding inside the keiretsu. 
Furthermore, we have removed financial institutions from the data 
set. Financial institutions'percentage of cross-shareholding is much 
higher than that of the other firms and their stock returns also show 
very high volatility. They are removed because of the bias they would 
bring into the portfolio formation process. This will reduce the sample 
by around 17 observations every year. In total there are about 100 firms 
in the sample for every year from 1983-1999. 
2 . Methodology 
Since we want to know whether there exist abnormal returns by 
investing in the portfolio's with high or low percentages of cross-
shareholding, we will use cumulative market-adjusted abnormal 
returns (CMAR's) to investigate this issue. The strategy here uses three 
basic steps. 
1 . Portfolio formation period : In the formation period, individual 
stocks are ranked according to their percentage of cross-sharehold-
ing. In most event-studies portfolio's are formed on past CAR's or 
past earnings, but here we will use cross-shareholding for the purpose 
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of portfolio formation. The formation period of the portfolio's will be 
referred to as time t=O. 
2 . Evaluation of future performance : After portfolio formation, we 
will calculate CMAR's for the individual stocks in the portfolio's and 
look at their future performance. The one year market adjusted 
abnormal returns, 2 year and 3 year cumulative market-adjusted 
returns (CMAR's) of the high and low cross-shareholding portfolio's 
are calculated. The evaluation period of the portfolio's will be refer・
red to as time t>O. 
3 . Testing the portfolio returns : Finally we will make some statisti・
cal inference on the portfolio's CMAR's. Statistically significant 
departures from zero for each portfolio or a significant difference in 
CMAR's between the high and low cross-shareholding portfolio's can 
then be interpreted as evidence supporting association between cross 
-shareholding and after-formation long-term stock performance. 
orizon returns and stat1st1cal inference 3. Long-h・ 
Recent methodological empirical studies disagree on which method to 
use to calculate long-run abnormal returns. Barber and Lyon (1997) 
favor buy-and-hold returns (BHAR's) while Fama (1998) recommends 
the use of cumulative abnormal returns (CAR's). Buy-and-hold returns 
are pointed out to be better because they reflect compounding in long 
returns while cumulative abnormal returns seem to have better statisti-
cal properties and allow for cleaner tests of mispricing. We can say 
however that BHAR's and CAR's have their own advantages and 
should be considered as complementary rather than competing 
approaches to computing abnormal returns. In this study we will 
present CAR's as our calculation method for the portfolio returns. 
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As is often pointed out, long-horizon (multi-year) tests are often 
misspecified (Conrad and Kaul, 1993; Kothari and Warner, 1997; Barber 
and Lyon, 1997; Fama, 1998). This raises the possibility that positive or 
negative abnormal returns are due to test misspecifation rather than 
mispricing. At least, conclusions from long-horizon returns require 
some caution. The direction and magnitude of bias in long-horizon 
returns can be sensitive to the way abnormal ret1;1rns are calculated. 
Also, the way abnormal returns are cumulated and how variance is 
estimated are also important problems one has to deal with. 
First of al, abnormal returns are very sensitive to the model used for 
estimating expected returns. Three models are commonly used. They 
are the market-adjusted return model, the Capital asset pricing model 
(CAPM) and the Fama-French three-factor model. We will use the 
market return to adjust returns and measure abnormal returns. The 
market-adjusted abnormal return for security i inyear t iscalculated 
as 
MARit = Rit -Rmt (3-1) 
where Rit is the yearly return of security i in year t and Rmt is the 
yearly return of the Topix market index・in year t. 
Second, cumulation of abnormal returns can be done in two ways. 
The standard procedure is cumulating abnormal returns by adding 
them (CAR's). Another procedure is to use the'buy-and-hold'proce-
dure, where the returns are the result of the product of one plus each 
abnormal return, minus one. In this study we will use the CAR's as long 
-horizon return measures. The cumulative market-adjusted abnormal 
yearly return for every firm is calculated as 
3 
CMAR戸 ~MARit (3-2) 
1~1 
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and the cumulative 3 year abnormal return for every portfolio is 
calculated as 
1凡CMARp1=-~CMARu N;~, 
where N is the number of stocks in the portfolio. 
(3-3) 
Third, the estimation of the variance of long-horizon abnormal 
returns is a difficult matter. Estimates of variance and therefore the 
test statistics can differ widely across different models. Although 
properties of long-horizon abnormal returns are not fully understood, 
standard estimated methods often underestimate the true variance, and 
often reject the null hypothesis easily. 
We test the null hypothesis that the abnormal returns of the portfolio's 
cumulated up to 3 years following formation are zero. The test statistic 
is the ratio of the average abnormal return to its estimated standard 
deviation. We estimate the standard deviation from the cross-section 
series of portfolio cumulative average abnormal returns. 
3 • Details of the test procedure 
1. The cross-shareholding data as calculated in the KIGYO KEIRET・
SU SORAN are used to rank firms conditional upon their percentage 
of shareholding. This ranking procedure is repeated every year from 
1983 to 1997 and gives us 15 data series of about 100 firms each, 
ranked on the percentage of cross-shareholding. As this percentage 
changes from year to year, the ranking of firms also changes. If a 
firm in a particular year does not belong to the biggest twenty 
shareholders in the group, it will not have a shareholding percentage 
and will therefore not be used for ranking. Although there are slight 
differences from year to year, most firms appear in the KIGYO 
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KEIRETSU SORAN every year and will therefore continuously 
appear in the ranking. We rank the firms from high to low, so that 
firms with the highest percentage of shareholding appear at the top, 
and firms with the lowest percentage of shareholding appear at the 
bottom of the ranked series. Next, portfolio's are formed. We divide 
firms ranked on shareholding into quartiles (4 groups). The top 
quartile is therefore made up of firms that have the highest percent-
age of shareholding, and the bottom quartile is made up of firms with 
the lowest percentage of shareholding. Ranking and formation of the 
portfolio's is referred to as t=O. 
2 . After formation, for every stock in the 4 shareholding portfolio's, 
one year market-adjusted returns, 2 and 3 year cumulated market-
adjusted returns (CMAR's) are calculated. The one year market 
adjusted returns of the portfolio's are calculated as 
1 1 
MARp1=-l MARit, where MARit=Rit-Rmt N;~, 
and the 3 year cumulated market-adjusted returns for the portfolio' 
s are computed as 
CMARp1 =j[ f CMARit 
;~1 
Stock returns are calculated like this for al 4 portfolio's for every 
year from 1983 to 1997, giving us portfolio returns for 15 overlapping 
three year periods. Proceeding like this we find 
CMARp1 (high) 
CMARp1 (low) 
where 
CMARp1 (high) is the cumulative market-adjusted return of the 
high cross-shareholding portfolio (first or top quartile) 
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CMARpt (low) is the cumulative market-adjusted return of the low 
cross-shareholding portfolio (fourth or bottom quartile) 
These are the portfolio's which we will mainly focus on. 
3. Using the CMAR's from al the 15 year overlapping test periods, we 
will test if 
CMARpt(hzgh) >O 
CM AR pt(low) > 0 
DCMARpt (high, low) > 0 
where 
DCM AR pt(high, low) is the difference between the cumulative 
abnormal returns of the high and the low cross-share-
holding portfolio. 
The t-test statistics used to test for CMARPt (high) > 0,CMARpt 
(low) > 0 and DC MAR pt(high, low) > 0 are 
t 
CMARp, (high) 
(3-4) 
<r[CMARpt(high)] 
t 
CMARp1 (low) 
(3-5) 
<1 [ CMARp, (low)] 
t 
CMARPt (high) -CMARp1 (low) 
(3-6) び[CMARpt (high)] + <Y [ CMARp1 (low)] 
where the standard deviation and the average returns for the portfo・
lio's are calculated as 
O'[CMAR叫=[f (CMARit-AvgCMARp1)2 / N-1] 
1 N、Avg(CMAR叫＝一~CMARit
N;~1 
0.5 
(3-7) 
(3-8) 
The basic idea of these statistical tests is that if there is a differ-
ence in the stock returns, the return of the high cross-shareholding 
portfolio should outperform the market return, or should outperform 
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the return of the low cross-shareholding portfolio. 
4. To test whether the percentage of shareholding in the keiretsu 
contributes to explaining CMAR's, we will also perform a multivar-
iate regression analysis. Next to the standard Least-Squares (OLS) 
estimation method, where observations of the firms are pooled over 
time, we will also use the panel data procedure for our estimation 
process. Because we use data pooled for over 15 years, the data set 
is probably influenced by several shocks. Panel data estimation will 
consider the structure of these mixed cross-section and time-series 
regress10ns. 
The classical linear regression model or the pooled (OLS) regres-
sion model that ignores the panel structure of the data is 
yit= a+ /3Xit+ Eit (3-9) 
where a is the overall intercept, X is a matrix of variables and Eu is 
the iふd.error. In this pooled model a single set of slope coefficients 
for al the observations is assumed. In the fixed effect or "Within" 
panel data estimation method, common slopes are assumed, but each 
cross section unit has its own intercept, which may or may not be 
correlated with the independent variables. The model is 
yit=a;+江 +cit (3-10) 
In order to control for the time-series structure of the panel data, 
we will also insert dummy variables for every year, excluding one to 
prevent perfect collinearity. This will give us a two way fixed effect 
model. Theorethically, we can establish this model as follows, 
Yu五＋江＋入t+Eu (3-11) 
where a; is the individual intercept or the fixed effect, .l1 is the time 
effect and Cit are the residuals. 
Another model for analyzing panel data is the Random effects 
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model. This model resembles the fixed effects or Within model, but 
it assumes that the intercepts are drawn from a common distribution 
with mean a and varianceが.Unlike the Within model, the estimates 
for the random effects model will not be consistent if the individual 
intercepts are correlated with the independent variables. Performing 
a Hausman specification test we find a significant correlation 
between the intercepts and the independent variables. The hypothesis 
being tested is whether the omission of fixed effects in the random 
effects model has any effect on the consistency of the random effects 
estimates. The test is based on the fact that if the individual effects 
are not correlated with the other regressors, both the fixed effects 
and the random effects estimator are consistent, whereas in the case 
of correlation between the individual effects and the regressors, the 
fixed effects estimator is consistent but the random effects estimator 
is not. Therefore, under the null hypothesis of no correlation, both the 
fixed effects and the random effects estimates should not differ 
systematically. The Hausman test is based on this difference. The 
Hausman test3> is defined as 
H=(瓦ran.ef.-fifix.ef.)'(varfix.ef. ―varan.ef.)→ (ftran.ef. —fifix•eff,) 
(3-12) 
and is distributed asymptotically asがwithdegrees of freedom under 
the null hypothesis that the random effects estimator is correct. The 
term in the middle is the difference between the covariance matrix of 
3) Hausman (1978) showed that the term in the middle of the test statistic, that 
is the difference between the covariance matrix of the fixed efect and the 
random efects, takes this convenient form because one does not have to 
compute the covariance between the two estimators. This is because the 
covariance of an eficient estimator with it's difference from an ineficient 
estimator is zero. 
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the coefficients estimated under the fixed effects model and the 
covariance matrix estimated under the random effects model. If the 
difference between the two estimates (fixed effects and random 
effects) is large, we can reject the adequacy of the random effects 
model. We performed a Hausman specification test (results are not 
reported) to check the difference between the 2 models and could 
reject the null hypothesis of no correlation between the fixed and 
random effects model most of the time. For this reason we chose the 
Fixed (Within) model rather than the Random effects model as the 
best way to estimate the regressions. 
The OLS and Fixed effects panel data regressions run are, 
lyearMAR戸町尻(Beta)け危(E/P)げ珈(B/P)け邸C/P)1+ 
趾 (LogSize)t + Pat (Cross)叶趾YRdumけ Et
3yearCMAR戸 at+趾 (Beta)t + Pu (EI P)げ趾(B/P)け邸C/P)け
Pst (LogSize) t+ Pat (Cross)げ肱YRdumけ Et
The independent variables in the regressions are, 
(Beta) : Measure of systematic risk (Factor loadings earned by re-
gressing 3 year monthly returns on the TOPIX index market 
return). 
(E/P) : Earnings-to-price ratio (Earnings yield). 
(B/P) : The ratio of the book value of equity to the market value of 
equity. 
(C/P) : Cash-flow-to-price ratio (Cash-flow yield). CF calculated as 
earnings plus depreciation. 
(LogSize) : The Natural Logarithm of the market value of equity. 
(CROSS) : Percentage of shareholding in the keiretsu (as defined 
above). 
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(YRdum) : Dummy variables for years between 1983 and 1999. 
We regress the 1 year market-adjusted return and 3 year cumulat-
ed market-adjusted return・on the individual firms'level of cross-
shareholding, their systematic risk and a set of fundamental vari-
ables. Market risk is captured by the beta variable and the earnings 
yield, book-to-market ratio, cash-flow-to-price ratio and firm-size 
variables control for firm-specific risk. 
The regressions are run for the whole 1983-97 period, and are run 
separately for the 1983-89 and 1990-97 periods, because we want to 
control for the structural change of the Japanese economy after the 
bursting of the bubble at the end of 1989. 
IV. Results 
Table I shows the portfolio market adjusted cumulative returns4> and 
the summary statistics for the 4 portfolios conditionally formed on the 
cross-shareholding variable. Using these portfolio returns we will 
examine the relation between the cross-holding of equity and stock-
returns. Every quartile portfolio contains about 100 firms. We will 
track each portfolio's return performance for three years. 
Looking at Panel A, we see that for the 1983-'89 period, both the 
average lyear market-adjusted return and the average 2year cumula-
tive market-adjusted return for the top quartile or high cross-sharehol-
ding portfolio were negative (-1.51 % and -3.32 %), while the cumula-
tive return turned slightly positive in the third year after portfolio 
4) The one year raw returns and their descriptive statistics for the 4 portfolio's 
are shown in appendix 2. 
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formation (2.57 %). Next, looking at the average returns for the 1990-' 
97 period we see that the top quartile portfolio did relatively well. The 
average lyear market-adjusted return (1.23 %), the average 2year 
cumulative market-adjusted return (2.8 %) and the average 3year 
cumulative market-adjusted return (1.21 %) were al positive, meaning 
the top quartile portfolio slightly outperformed the market. Panel D, 
showing the returns for the bottom quartile or the low cross-sharehold-
ing portfolio shows a different picture. We can see that the average 
cumulative returns for the 1983-'89 period were highly positive (8.91 %, 
17.78 %, 25.22 %), while for the 1990-'97 period they were highly nega-
tive (-5.25 %, -8.57 %, 20.72 %). Th ese portfolio returns also show 
strong evidence that the high cross-shareholding portfolio underperfor-
med the low cross-shareholding portfolio in the 1983-'89 period and 
outperformed it in the 1990-'97 period. 
Table 1 : Portfolio returns and summary statistics 
Panel A: Top quartile (high cros-shareholding portfolio) 
Year N 1 yr.MAR 2yearCMAR 3yearCMAR cross E/P LogSize B/M C/P beta 
83 25 -5.67 -26.78 -28.58 1.032 2.60 26.86 44.34 8.19 1.33 
84 25 -21.87 -22.82 -32.03 1.030 3.58 26.93 46.12 8.83 0.97 
85 25 -0.96 -10.17 18.04 1.015 2.74 27.08 45.42 7 95 0.87 
86 25 -7.05 -4.85 25.24 1143 1.00 27.52 3515 515 1.13 
87 25 4.02 24 28 23.37 1 015 1.69 27.55 3232 4.40 1.08 
88 24 21.59 20.41 18.17 1.003 168 28.01 24.94 3.47 1.06 
89 25 -0.66 -330 -6.20 0.953 1 67 28.25 22.10 3.09 0.96 
90 25 -1.73 -466 -4.34 0.945 289 27.75 40.39 5.49 1.01 
91 25 -3.77 -2.29 1.40 0.962 2.54 2774 45 41 6.07 1.00 
92 26 1.85 4 70 13.21 0.987 1.84 27.50 59.13 6.37 0.95 
93 25 4.18 13.49 15.80 0.933 1.07 27.62 52.14 5.44 1.04 
94 26 9.66 1160 14 65 0.903 1.54 27.70 62.42 6 68 0.98 
95 26 1.94 4.99 -0.77 0.882 124 2781 44.36 463 1.05 
96 26 3.05 -2 71 0.06 0.871 0.98 27.73 49.66 4.79 1.00 
97 26 -5.35 -2 70 -30.34 0.908 1.13 27.43 72.60 6 74 1.00 
Aver. 1983-'89 1ー.51 -332 2.57 1.03 2.14 27.46 35.77 5.87 1.06 
Aver. 1990-'97 1.23 2 80 1.21 092 1.65 27.66 53 26 5.78 1.00 
Aver. 1983-'97 -0.05 -0.05 1.85 0.97 1.88 27.56 4510 5 82 1.03 
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Panel B: Second quartile 
year N 1 yr.MAR 2yearCMAR 3yearCMAR cross E/P LogSize 8/M C/P beta 
83 25 -6.02 -25.36 -25 23 0.357 2.69 25 95 57 39 8.76 0.96 
84 25 -17 98 -1741 -2030 0 348 3.98 26.05 56 72 10.40 0 91
85 25 0.28 3.02 45 97 0.335 2.01 26 20 52 83 8.01 0.75 
86 25 -4 362 5 50 31 70 0.327 120 26 59 38 52 5.88 1.04 
87 25 8 366 50.09 56 99 0 312 1.73 26 82 35 02 5 59 1.05 
88 24 40.61 44.47 4016 0.316 1 56 27.38 23 07 3.45 1.09 
89 25 6 66 301 0 84 0304 1.75 27.60 21.64 3 26 0.91 
90 25 -3.01 -5.65 -650 0290 2 57 27.02 39 22 5.31 1 29 
91 25 -3.88 -5.42 -11.83 0.297 241 2702 4129 5.35 1.39 
92 26 -118 -7 97 464 0.295 2.16 26.70 56.66 6 23 1.31 
93 25 -6 91 5 63 2 88 0.288 1.19 26 73 54.43 5.51 119 
94 26 13.16 10.64 10.50 a 267 0.84 26 94 45.09 4.85 114 
95 26 -0.41 -090 -14.79 0.262 1.41 26 79 45 77 4 86 1.23 
96 26 1ー.41 -15.47 -6 64 0.254 2.08 26 66 51 32 5.56 1.24 
97 26 -16.51 -10 66 -5005 0.268 -1 23 26 23 9450 4 37 1.16 
Aver. 1983-'89 3,94 9.05 18.59 0 33 213 26 65 40.74 6 48 0.96 
Aver. 1990-'97 -2 52 -3 72 -8 97 0 28 143 26 76 53 54 5.26 1 24 
Aver. 1983-'97 0.49 2 24 3 89 0 30 1.76 26 71 47 56 5.83 111 
Panel C: Third quartile 
year N lyr. MAR 2yearCMAR JyearCMAR cross E/P LogSize 8/M C/P beta 
83 25 7.391 -9 82 -4 60 0.174 2 25 25 34 48 76 10.49 1.52 
84 25 -15 09 -9.48 -23.75 0.178 2 95 25 34 51.66 11.08 1.33 
85 25 4 78 -13 78 6 53 0.175 2.46 25 64 4480 9.14 0 87 
86 25 -9.07 1124 45 77 0165 0.87 25 97 35 82 5 69 113 
87 25 24.40 5515 67.23 0158 1 74 26.29 29.75 5.01 0 95 
88 24 31 43 45.18 39 55 a 155 1 54 26 89 21.05 3 23 094 
89 25 11.27 6.03 1.73 0152 1 44 27 21 1913 2 82 0 71
90 25 -5.80 -10 64 -11,28 0143 3 00 26 54 40 83 6 29 1 18 
91 25 -2.51 -5 43 -8 89 0 147 1.91 26 51 41 83 6.17 1 24 
92 26 -180 -4 63 7 60 0 142 0.69 26 30 55 05 6.79 1.15 
93 25 -2 66 7 54 6 39 0.134 1 35 26 36 52.44 6 76 1.13 
94 26 9.10 8 28 2.41 0 123 0.65 26 55 45 24 4 72 0.98 
95 26 -4 51 -7 52 -32 49 0.115 0 98 26 55 46 64 5 22 1 07 
96 26 -4.87 -26 64 -1256 a 109 2.28 26 50 55.44 7 16 1 06 
97 26 -14 64 -0.87 -_47 97 0.117 1.03 2615 96.11 9 76 0.93 
Aver. 1983-'89 7 87 12.07 18 92 0.17 1 89 2610 35 85 6 78 1 06 
Aver. 1990-'97 -3.46 -4 99 -1210 0.13 1.49 26 43 54 20 6.61 1.09 
Aver. 1983-"97 1.83 2 97 2 38 015 1.68 26 28 4564 6.69 1.08 
Figure 1 and 2 give us a better picture of the long term performance 
of stock-returns of the cross-shareholding portfolios. In figure 1 we 
will plot the average cumulative returns for the 1983-'89 period up until 
3 years after portfolio formation. 
The top quartile portfolio which exists of about 25 firms with the 
highest percentage of cross-shareholding shows a cumulative return 
moving in an almost horizontal line. The cumulative returns earned 
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Panel D: Bottom quartile (low cross-shareholding portfolio) 
year N 1 yr.MAR 2yearCMAR JyearCMAR cros E/P LogSize 8/M C/P beta 
83 25 -3.41 -1163 -6.03 0.078 1.45 25 20 45.47 7.68 0.70 
84 25 -7.05 5 37 -12.2 0.078 2.57 2511 4531 7.64 0.76 
85 25 17.21 5.39 26.26 0.082 0.92 25 41 35.94 5.97 0.95 
86 25 -15.54 14 86 32.02 0.078 -134 25 53 3277 3.40 0.97 
87 25 33 73 56.04 87.13 0.070 0.85 25.82 2620 3.62 0.85 
8 24 14 48 37 8 31 28 0 079 2.05 26 31 24 61 3 95 0 82
89 25 2 95 16 52 1813 0 076 1.51 26 70 18 05 2 76 0 87
90 25 -7 64 -5.45 -9,29 0 070 210 26 03 31 62 4.51 1 21
91 25 0.81 0 92 -10 71 0,084 2.82 26 24 38 31 5 85 1 48
92 26 0 64 -14.02 -3、26 0075 1 69 25 82 50 3 6.26 140 
93 25 -12 24 -064 -2 51 0069 0.51 25 81 54 89 5 83 1.3 
94 26 14 5 1214 5.0 0067 1.92 25 93 45 91 6.16 1 21
95 26 -1.26 -10.35 -3740 0.063 2.84 25 98 48.48 7.45 1.20 
96 26 -6 86 -3559 -21.37 0.059 1 29 25 8 56 94 6.54 116 
97 26 -30.01 -1561 -86.25 0.060 -118 24 96 126.80 8 92 1.10 
Aver. 1983-'89 8.91 17 78 25 2 0.08 114 25 73 3262 5.0 0.85 
Aver. 190-'97 -5 25 -857 -20.72 0.07 150 25 83 56 6 6.4 1.26 
Aver. 1983-'97 1 36 3.72 0.72 0.07 1.3 25 78 45.4 5.7 1.07 
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Figure 1 : Average cumulative market-adjusted returns of the 4 
cross-shareholding portfolios for the 1983-89 period 
were only slightly under and above the zero percent line, indicating it 
didn't differ much from the market return. On the contrary, looking at 
the cumulative returns for the bottom quartile, or the portfolio of firms 
with the lowest percentage of stock-returns, we see that it significantly 
departs from zero in the three years after portfolio formation. Compar-
ing the top and bottom quartile, we notice that the low cross-sharehold-
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ing highly outperforms the high cross-shareholding portfolio. It is also 
interesting to see that the cumulative returns for the four portfolios 
move beautifully together, one, two and three years after portfolio 
formation. The top quartile portfolio stays at the bottom while the 
bottom quartile portfolio stays at the top. The 2nd and 3d quartile 
portfolio returns stay in between without intersecting with the other 
portfolio's. 
In figure 2, were we plot the 1990-'97 period average cumulative 
market-adjusted returns for the four cross-shareholding portfolios, we 
can see that in comparison with figure 1, the bottom quartile portfolio 
now shows significant minus returns in the three years after portfolio 
formation. Significantly high minus returns show that the low cross-
shareholding portfolio underperformed the market return in the 1990-' 
97 period. Looking at the high cross-shareholding portfolio, we see that 
it stil moves horizontally, showing only a small outperformance of the 
market return. 
5~- -----------------------------------・ 
。ー? ? ? ? ? ?
-15 ,j-------------------------------'-------． top quartile ． 2nd quartile 
-20吟・-----------------------------------
-25 
. 
3d quartile 
X bottom quartile 
year 
Figure 2 : Average cumulative market-adjusted returns of the 4 
cross-shareholding portfolios for the 1990-97 period 
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Comparing the high and low portfolios we can see that from 1990 to 
1997, the high cross-shareholding portfolio outperforms the low one 
with a significant amount. Here again, the cumulative returns of the 
four portfolios move beautifully together, one, two and three years 
after portfolio formation. Now the top quartile portfolio stays at the 
top while the bottom quartile portfolio stays at the bottom. The 2nd and 
3d quartile portfolio returns show also minus returns and stay in 
between without intersecting with the other portfolios. 
Further, in Table 2 we give the correlation matrix for the one year 
market adjusted return and the other independent variables. Since this 
matrix shows the correlation coefficient calculated using the whole 
sample, the relation between the stock-returns and cross-shareholding 
variable is only slightly minus. Looking at the cross-shareholding 
variable, we see that it shows positive correlation 
Table 2 : Correlation matrix of the independent variables 
Return CROSS E/P Size 8/M C/P beta 
Return 
CROSS -0018 1 
E/P 0.054 0.051 1 
Size 0.167 0.493 0.096 
B/M -0.341 -0041 -0.017 -0.278 
0/P -0.130 -0026 0532 -0077 0 349 1 
Beta -0008 -0.012 0,003 0.001 -0.009 0052 
with the size variable. Also of interest is the positive relation between 
the earnings yield and cash-flow yield variables. They show to be the 
most correlated variables used, with a correlation coefficient of about 
0.53. The other variables show litle sign of correlation, which should 
avoid multicollinearity in the regression analysis. 
Next we will turn to the statistical testing of our long-term perfor-
mance returns. Panel A and B of Table 3 show the statistical inference 
of the market adjusted cumulative returns of the high and low 
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Table 3 : Statistical inference of 1 year market adjusted returns and 
3 year CAR's : t-statistics (5%, two-tailed test) 
Panel A : !year market adjusted returns, !-statistics 
(t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) Dif. 
Year pair N Mean Var. High> O Low〉0 High/Low〉0
1983 High 25 -5.7 723.53 -1.054 -0.73 -032 
Low 25 -3 41 542.56 
1984 High 25 -21.87 17711 -8.215 -1.45 -2678 
Low 25 -7.05 587 21 
1985 High 25 -0.96 74393 -0176 1.963 -1 759 
Low 25 17.21 1920.12 
1986 High 25 -7.05 1204.75 -1.015 -2.2 0.862 
Low 25 -15 54 124.94 
1987 High 25 4 02 1071.17 0.613 3 297 -2 47 
Low 25 33 73 2617 54 
198 High 24 21 59 2949.5 1.947 2.08 0 543 
Low 24 14.48 1163 05 
1989 High 25 -0 6 368.48 -0.172 3 458 -3.08 
Low 25 22 95 11011 
190 High 25 -1 73 89.74 -0,913 -2 982 1.854 
Low 25 -7.64 164 05 
191 High 25 -3.7 10218 -1 866 0 37 -1.54 
Low 25 0.81 18.85 
192 High 26 1.85 143.25 0 78 0 203 0.306 
Low 26 0.64 259.5 
193 High 25 418 201.29 1 474 -3.681 3.757 
Low 25 -12.24 276.57 
194 High 26 9 6 19.43 4.507 3.27 -0.9 
Low 26 14 5 514.91 
195 High 26 1 94 190.47 0 716 -0 417 0 78 
Low 26 -1 26 236,63 
196 High 26 3 05 262,95 0,96 -2 275 2 262 
Low 26 -6 86 236 51 
197 High 26 -5.34 51 61 -1 205 -7 754 419 
Low 26 -30.01 389.48 
Aver.83-89 -1.153 0.913 -1268 
Aver.90-97 0.58 -1.658 1.328 
portfolios. The returns, their variance and the different t-test statistics 
are reported. Like already seen in the details of the test procedure, we 
will test whether the returns of the high cross-shareholding portfolio 
differ significantly from zero (CMARp1 (high) > 0), whether the returns 
of the low cross-shareholding portfolio differ significantly from zero 
(CMARp1(low) >O), and whether the difference of the high and low 
cross-shareholding portfolio's returns differ significantly from zero 
(DCMARp1(high, low) >O). 
From Panel A we can see that on average the high cross-sharehold-
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ing portfolio does not outperform the market, neither in the 1983-'89 
nor in the 1990-'97 period. The low cross-shareholding portfolio on 
average slightly underperforms the market in the 1990-'97 period (aver-
age t-stat of -1.658). As for the difference between the high and low 
portfolio's, on average we find no statistically significant difference 
between them (average t-stat. of -1.268 and 1.328). 
Looking at the t-statistics for the 3year cumulative returns in Panel 
B, we get a better picture of the long term performance of the stock 
returns from the different portfolio's. We can confirm that the high 
cross-shareholding portfolio did not significantly do better than the 
Panel B: Jyear CMAR's, I-statistics 
(t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) Dif, 
year pair N Mean Var, High> 0 Low > 0 High/Low >O 
1983 H;gh 25 -28,58 1702 01 -3 464 -0592 -1.72 
Low 25 -6,03 2590 45 
1984 High 25 -32.03 2754,56 -3 052 -0 95 -1 19 
Low 25 -12.2 4135 14 
1985 High 25 18.04 6027.04 1162 1614 -0.365 
Low 25 26 26 613.7 
1986 High 25 25.24 6530.75 1 562 3.143 -0 35 
Low 25 32 02 2595 24 
1987 High 25 23.37 574.73 1.565 4.969 -2.768 
Low 25 87.13 7686.73 
198 High 24 1817 3039 6 1.615 2 801 -0.826 
Low 24 31.28 291 67 
1989 High 25 -6 20 49.23 -1 462 2 348 -2.762 
Low 25 18 13 1490.21 
190 High 25 -4 34 213 23 -1 487 -I 772 0.823 
Low 25 -9 29 686 91 
191 High 25 1 40 265 38 0429 -2 237 2 09
Low 25 -10 71 57317 
192 High 26 13.21 308 24 3 836 -0 63 2.645 
Low 26 -3 26 699 32 
193 H;gh 25 15.80 307 35 4507 -0.6 3 351
Low 25 -251 39 52 
194 High 26 14 65 406 83 3.704 1 269 1.73 
Low 26 5.0 40365 
195 High 26 -077 1418.8 -0.105 -5 82 3.741 
Low 26 -37.40 1073.4 
196 High 26 0.06 116414 O.o1 -3.5 2.383 
Low 26 -21.37 939.42 
197 High 26 -30 34 3245 78 -2 715 -10 93 4 087
Low 26 -86 25 1619.91 
Aver.83-89 -0 296 1 905 -1.426 
Aver.90-97 1 022 -3 034 2.606 
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market (average t-stat of -0.296 and 1.02). But we can verify that the 
low cross-shareholding portfolio on average did better than the market 
in the 1983-'89 period and did worse in the 1990-'97 period. Comparing 
the difference of the high and low portfolio returns, we find t-statistics 
indicating that the high cross-shareholding portfolio did slightly under-
perform the low cross-shareholding portfolio in the 1983-'89 period (t-
stat of -1.426), and significantly outperformed it in the 1990-'97 period 
(t-stat of 2.606). 
Comparing the evidence with the hypotheses, we can make the 
following conclusions. First, concerning hypothesis one, which com-
pares the portfolio returns to the market returns, we could find no 
evidence of any abnormal returns for the high shareholding portfolio. 
We can therefore not support the null hypothesis of abnormal returns. 
Since we did not find significant underperformance of the high cross-
shareholding portfolio either, we can only indirectly support the alter-
native hypothesis of no abnormal returns. Indirectly we can conclude 
that the purpose of the cross-holding of equity is not to maximize the 
market value of equity. 
Second, concerning hypothesis two, which compares the abnormal 
returns of the high and the low cross-shareholding portfolio's, we find 
slight evidence of the high shareholding portfolio underperforming the 
low shareholding portfolio. That is at least for the 1983-'89 period. For 
the 1990-'97 period we see a contrasting outperformance of the low 
shareholding portfolio. This contrasting evidence leads to both support-
ing the null and the alternative hypothesis. 
So only when compared to the low cross-shareholding portfolio and 
only in the 1990-'97 period do we find evidence of an abnormal return 
premium. We can not say this evidence is strong enough to conclude 
Cross-shareholding and the Long-run Performance of Stock Returns in the 
Japanese Keiretsu: An Empirical Analysis using panel data (Jurgen) (331)121 
that a high level of cross-shareholding in the keiretsu leads to maximiz-
ing the value of market equity or stock-returns. 
In the next section we run a series of multivariate OLS and panel 
data regressions to investigate the robustness of our results. 
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